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The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness By Gerald M. Edelman Edelman proposes nothing less than a model of consciousness – one that is speculative but philosophically sophisticated and solidly grounded in his own pathbreaking work on neural Darwinism. This could be the way thinking works! The Remembered Present is a book that everyone interested in the mind – cognitive scientists and philosophers as well as neuroscientists – will be discussing for years to come. Edelman's theory centers around the notion of reentry – ongoing recursive signaling across multiple reciprocally connected brain regions present mainly in the thalamocortical system. It recognizes the fundamental beginnings provided by the complementary efforts of Ramon y Cajal and Willam James. Edelman argues that memory is not placed in the brain as a content, but as a reentrant strengthening of synaptic connections which, by reinforcement during the re-telling, can strengthen to the level of long-term potentiation (LTP) that would create what we call permanent memories. If a memory of an event is reinforced by relating it to others, it stays in the same place, but that place becomes easier to visit with each relating. In addition to providing a scientific account of brain function and consciousness, the theory advanced in The Remembered Present will have a significant impact on a wide variety of fields. It provides a new outlook that may prompt fundamental revisions in the way linguists view language, physicians classify mental diseases, and philosophers look at the mind-body problem. |
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Topobiology By Gerald M. Edelman If you had a complete copy of a dinosaur’s DNA and the genetic code, you still would not be able to make a dinosaur – or even determine what one looked like. Why? How do animals get their shape and how does shape evolve? In this important book, Nobel laureate Gerald M. Edelman challenges the notion that an understanding of the genetic code and of cell differentiation is sufficient to answer these questions. Rather, he argues, a trio of related issues must also be investigated – the development of form, the evolution of form, and the morphological and functional bases of behavior. Topobiology presents an introduction to molecular embryology and describes a comprehensive hypothesis to account for the evolution and development of animal form. |
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Wider Than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness By Gerald M. Edelman "Consciousness is the guarantor of all we hold to be human and precious. Its permanent loss is considered equivalent to death, even if the body persists in its vital signs." It is with this allusion to the permanent vegetative state that Gerald Edelman opens his latest book, Wider Than the Sky. Edelman aims to answer the question of how the firing of our neurons gives rise to conscious, subjective experiences – or, as philosophers call it, "qualia." He hopes "to disenthrall those who believe the subject is exclusively metaphysical or necessarily mysterious." The title of the book comes from a poem by Emily Dickinson: "The Brain – is wider than the Sky – / For – put them side by side – / The one the other will contain" (circa 1862). Having laid the groundwork in his critically acclaimed books Neural Darwinism (1987), Topobiology (1988), Remembered Present (1990), Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (1992), and A Universe of Consciousness (2000, written with Giulio Tononi), Edelman here elegantly summarizes his thinking on consciousness. |
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How Brains Make Up Their Minds By Walter J. Freeman I think, therefore I am. The legendary pronouncement of philosopher René Descartes lingers as accepted wisdom in the Western world nearly four centuries after its author's death. But does thought really come first? Who actually runs the show: we, our thoughts, or the neurons firing within our brains? Walter J. Freeman explores how we control our behavior and make sense of the world around us. Avoiding determinism both in sociobiology, which proposes that persons' genes control their brains' functioning, and in neuroscience, which posits that their brains' disposition is molded by chemistry and environmental forces, Freeman charts a new course – one that gives individuals due credit and responsibility for their actions. Drawing upon his five decades of research in neuroscience, Freeman utilizes the latest advances in his field as well as perspectives from disciplines as diverse as mathematics, psychology, and philosophy to explicate how different human brains act in their chosen diverse ways. He clarifies the implications of brain imaging, by which neural activity can be observed during the course of normal movements, and shows how nonlinear dynamics reveals order within the fecund chaos of brain function. |
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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong By Jerry Fodor The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and superbly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. |
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In Critical Condition: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and the Philosophy of Mind By Jerry Fodor In this book Jerry Fodor contrasts his views about the mind with those of a number of well-known philosophers and cognitive scientists, including John McDowell, Christopher Peacocke, Paul Churchland, Daniel Dennett, Paul Smolensky, and Richard Dawkins. Several of these essays are published here for the first time. The rest originated as book reviews in the Times Literary Supplement, the London Review of Books, or in journals of philosophy or psychology. The topics examined include cognitive architecture, the nature of concepts, and the status of Darwinism in psychology. Fodor constructs a version of the Representational Theory of Mind that blends Intentional Realism, Computational Reductionism, Nativism, and Semantic Atomism. |
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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind By Jerry Fodor Cognitivism argues that psychology studies behavior to infer unobservable theoretical constructs, such as 'belief,' that summarize and explain empirical observations and predict new phenomena. Here, Fodor tries to provide a scientific account of commonsense belief/desire psychology by defending a representational theory of mind. Assuming that there is no alternative to the vocabulary of commonsense psychological explanation, he proposes that we have an infinite set of mental symbols at our disposal and that a propositional attitude is equivalent to a symbol's occurring and its functioning in a particular causal role. Underlying his account is the view that mental processes will turn out to be physical processes. Highly recommended for philosophers of mind and cognitive psychologists. |
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RePresentations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science By Jerry Fodor A collection of eleven essays dealing with methodological and empirical issues in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind, Representations convincingly connects philosophical speculation to concrete empirical research. One of the outstanding methodological issues dealt with is the status of functionalism considered as an alternative to behavioristic and physicalistic accounts. of mental states and properties. The other issue is the status of reductionism considered as an account of the relation between the psychological and physical sciences. The first chapters present the main lines of argument which have made functionalism the currently favored philosophical approach to ontology of the mental. The outlines of a psychology of propositional attitudes which emerges from consideration of current developments in cognitive science are contained in the remaining essays. Not all of these essays are re-presentations. The new introductory essay seeks to present an overview and gives some detailed proposals about the contribution that functionalism makes to the solutions of problems about intentionality. The concluding essay, also not previously published, is a sustained examination of the relation between theories about the structure of concepts and theories about how they are learned. Finally, the essay "Three cheers for propositional attitudes", a critical examination of some of Daniel Dennett's ideas, has been completely rewritten for this volume. |
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The Language of Thought By Jerry Fodor The Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) postulates that thought and thinking take place in a mental language. This language consists of a system of representations that is physically realized in the brain of thinkers and has a combinatorial syntax (and semantics) such that operations on representations are causally sensitive only to the syntactic properties of representations. According to LOTH, thought is, roughly, the tokening of a representation that has a syntactic (constituent) structure with an appropriate semantics. Thinking thus consists in syntactic operations defined over such representations. Most of the arguments for LOTH derive their strength from their ability to explain certain empirical phenomena like productivity and systematicity of thought and thinking. |
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The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology By Jerry Fodor Criticism from within always stings more sharply. When one of computational psychology's peppiest cheerleaders questions the enthusiasm of his fellows, we can expect some juicy, if civil, dialogue ahead. Jerry Fodor does just this in The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology. Named to answer Steven Pinker's How the Mind Works, this short, focused, and heavy book calls Pinker and others to task for claiming too much for CP. While acknowledging that it's "by far the best theory of cognition that we've got," he expresses concern about the popularizations – and privately held beliefs – that imply that the strongly nativist computational theory explains, or will explain, our conscious and intentional being in toto. Using scholarly, diplomatic, and sometimes hysterically funny language, Fodor demolishes the notion that CP has anything to say about large-scale or global thinking, and casts doubt on its future prospects. Proceeding more scientifically than his scientist colleagues, he proposes that a better theory of mind is looming, and will encompass CP much as relativity encompassed classical mechanics. Encouraging debate on the fundamentals of this increasingly popular theory, especially within the ranks of its adherents, can only be good for the theory and for cognitive science itself. The Mind Doesn't Work That Way follows in the great philosophical tradition of clobbering ideas in order to make them stronger, and provides a great mental workout for the reader. |
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