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Originally published
in the Huffington Post; used here with permission.
Why
There Almost Certainly Is No God
by
Richard Dawkins
America, founded in secularism as a beacon
of eighteenth century enlightenment, is becoming the victim of
religious politics, a circumstance that would have horrified the
Founding Fathers. The political ascendancy today values embryonic
cells over adult people. It obsesses about gay marriage, ahead
of genuinely important issues that actually make a difference to
the world. It gains crucial electoral support from a religious
constituency whose grip on reality is so tenuous that they expect
to be 'raptured' up to heaven, leaving their clothes as empty as
their minds. More extreme specimens actually long for a world war,
which they identify as the 'Armageddon' that is to presage the
Second Coming. Sam Harris, in his new short book, Letter to
a Christian Nation, hits the bull's-eye as usual:
It is, therefore, not an exaggeration
to say that if the city of New York were suddenly replaced by
a ball of fire, some significant
percentage of the American population would see a silver-lining
in the subsequent mushroom cloud, as it would suggest to them
that the best thing that is ever going to happen was about to
happen:
the return of Christ . . . Imagine the consequences if any significant
component of the U.S. government actually believed that the world
was about to end and that its ending would be glorious.
The fact that nearly half of the American population apparently
believes
this, purely on the basis of religious dogma, should be considered
a moral and intellectual emergency.
Does Bush check the Rapture
Index daily, as Reagan did his stars? We don't know, but would
anyone be surprised?
My scientific colleagues have additional reasons to declare emergency.
Ignorant and absolutist attacks on stem cell research are just
the tip of an iceberg. What we have here is nothing less than
a global assault on rationality, and the Enlightenment values
that
inspired the founding of this first and greatest of secular republics.
Science education – and hence the whole future of science in
this country – is under threat. Temporarily beaten back in a
Pennsylvania
court, the 'breathtaking inanity' (Judge John Jones's immortal
phrase) of 'intelligent design' continually flares up in local
bush-fires. Dowsing them is a time-consuming but important responsibility,
and scientists are finally being jolted out of their complacency.
For years they quietly got on with their science, lamentably
underestimating the creationists who, being neither competent
nor interested in
science, attended to the serious political business of subverting
local school boards. Scientists, and intellectuals generally,
are now waking up to the threat from the American Taliban.
Scientists
divide into two schools of thought over the best tactics with
which to face the threat. The Neville Chamberlain 'appeasement'
school focuses on the battle for evolution. Consequently, its members
identify fundamentalism as the enemy, and they bend over backwards
to appease 'moderate' or 'sensible' religion (not a difficult task,
for bishops and theologians despise fundamentalists as much as
scientists
do). Scientists of the Winston Churchill school, by contrast, see
the fight for evolution as only one battle in a larger war: a looming
war between supernaturalism on the one side and rationality on
the other. For them, bishops and theologians belong with creationists
in the supernatural camp, and are not to be appeased.
The Chamberlain school accuses Churchillians of rocking the boat
to the point of muddying the waters. The philosopher of science
Michael Ruse wrote:
We who love science must realize that the
enemy of our enemies is our friend. Too often evolutionists spend
time
insulting would-be
allies. This is especially true of secular evolutionists. Atheists
spend more time running down sympathetic Christians than they do
countering creationists. When John Paul II wrote a letter endorsing
Darwinism, Richard Dawkins's response was simply that the pope
was
a hypocrite, that he could not be genuine about science and that
Dawkins himself simply preferred an honest fundamentalist.
A recent
article in the New York Times by Cornelia Dean quotes the astronomer
Owen Gingerich as saying that, by simultaneously
advocating
evolution and atheism, 'Dr Dawkins "probably single-handedly
makes more converts to intelligent design than any of the leading
intelligent design theorists".' This is not the first, not
the second, not even the third time this plonkingly witless point
has
been made (and more than one reply has aptly cited Uncle Remus: "Oh
please please Brer Fox, don't throw me in that awful briar patch").
Chamberlainites are apt to quote the late Stephen
Jay Gould's 'NOMA' – 'non-overlapping
magisteria'. Gould claimed that science and
true religion never come into conflict because they exist in
completely separate dimensions of discourse:
To say it for all
my colleagues and for the umpteenth millionth time (from college
bull sessions to learned treatises): science
simply
cannot (by its legitimate methods) adjudicate the issue of God's
possible superintendence of nature. We neither affirm nor deny
it; we simply can't comment on it as scientists.
This sounds terrific,
right up until you give it a moment's thought. You then realize
that the presence of a creative deity in the
universe is clearly a scientific hypothesis. Indeed, it is
hard to imagine
a more momentous hypothesis in all of science. A universe with
a god would be a completely different kind of universe from
one without,
and it would be a scientific difference. God could clinch the
matter in his favour at any moment by staging a spectacular
demonstration of his powers, one that would satisfy the exacting
standards
of
science. Even the infamous Templeton Foundation recognized
that God is a scientific
hypothesis – by funding double-blind trials to test whether
remote prayer would speed the recovery of heart patients. It
didn't, of
course, although a control group who knew they had been prayed
for tended to get worse (how about a class action suit against
the Templeton
Foundation?) Despite such well-financed efforts, no evidence
for God's existence has yet appeared.
To see the disingenuous hypocrisy of religious people who embrace
NOMA, imagine that forensic archeologists, by some unlikely
set of circumstances, discovered DNA evidence demonstrating
that
Jesus was
born of a virgin mother and had no father. If NOMA enthusiasts
were sincere, they should dismiss the archeologists' DNA out
of hand: "Irrelevant.
Scientific evidence has no bearing on theological questions. Wrong
magisterium." Does anyone seriously imagine that they would
say anything remotely like that? You can bet your boots that not
just the fundamentalists but every professor of theology and every
bishop in the land would trumpet the archeological evidence to the
skies.
Either Jesus had a father or he didn't. The question is a scientific
one, and scientific evidence, if any were available, would
be used to settle it. The same is true of any miracle – and
the
deliberate
and intentional creation of the universe would have to have
been the mother and father of all miracles. Either it happened
or
it didn't. It is a fact, one way or the other, and in our state
of
uncertainty
we can put a probability on it – an estimate that may change
as more information comes in. Humanity's best estimate of the
probability
of divine creation dropped steeply in 1859 when The Origin
of Species was published, and it has declined steadily during
the
subsequent
decades, as evolution consolidated itself from plausible theory
in
the nineteenth century to established fact today.
The Chamberlain tactic of snuggling up to 'sensible' religion,
in order to present a united front against ('intelligent design')
creationists,
is fine if your central concern is the battle for evolution.
That is a valid central concern, and I salute those who press
it, such
as Eugenie Scott in Evolution versus Creationism. But if you
are concerned with the stupendous scientific question of whether
the
universe was created by a supernatural intelligence or not,
the lines are drawn completely differently. On this larger
issue,
fundamentalists are united with 'moderate' religion on one
side, and I find myself
on the other.
Of course, this all presupposes that the God we are talking
about is a personal intelligence such as Yahweh, Allah, Baal,
Wotan,
Zeus or Lord Krishna. If, by 'God', you mean love, nature,
goodness, the
universe, the laws of physics, the spirit of humanity, or Planck's
constant, none of the above applies. An American student asked
her professor whether he had a view about me. 'Sure,' he replied.
'He's
positive science is incompatible with religion, but he waxes
ecstatic about nature and the universe. To me, that is religion!'
Well,
if that's what you choose to mean by religion, fine, that makes
me a religious man. But if your God is a being who designs
universes, listens to prayers, forgives sins, wreaks miracles,
reads your
thoughts,
cares about your welfare and raises you from the dead, you
are unlikely to be satisfied. As the distinguished American
physicist
Steven Weinberg
said, "If you want to say that 'God is energy,' then you can
find God in a lump of coal." But don't expect congregations
to flock to your church.
When Einstein said 'Did God have a choice in creating the Universe?'
he meant 'Could the universe have begun in more than one way?'
'God does not play dice' was Einstein's poetic way of doubting
Heisenberg's
indeterminacy principle. Einstein was famously irritated when
theists misunderstood him to mean a personal God. But what
did he expect?
The hunger to misunderstand should have been palpable to him.
'Religious' physicists usually turn out to be so only in the
Einsteinian sense:
they are atheists of a poetic disposition. So am I. But, given
the widespread yearning for that great misunderstanding, deliberately
to confuse Einsteinian pantheism with supernatural religion
is an
act of intellectual high treason.
Accepting, then, that the God Hypothesis is a proper scientific
hypothesis whose truth or falsehood is hidden from us only
by lack of evidence,
what should be our best estimate of the probability that God
exists, given the evidence now available? Pretty low I think,
and here's
why.
First, most of the traditional arguments for God's existence,
from Aquinas on, are easily demolished. Several of them, such
as the
First Cause argument, work by setting up an infinite regress
which God
is wheeled out to terminate. But we are never told why God
is magically able to terminate regresses while needing no explanation
himself.
To be sure, we do need some kind of explanation for the origin
of all things. Physicists and cosmologists are hard at work
on
the problem.
But whatever the answer – a random quantum fluctuation or a Hawking/Penrose singularity or whatever we end up calling it – it will be simple.
Complex, statistically improbable things, by definition, don't just
happen; they demand an explanation in their own right. They are impotent
to terminate regresses, in a way that simple things are not. The
first cause cannot have been an intelligence – let alone an intelligence
that answers prayers and enjoys being worshipped. Intelligent, creative,
complex, statistically improbable things come late into the universe,
as the product of evolution or some other process of gradual escalation
from simple beginnings. They come late into the universe and therefore
cannot be responsible for designing it.
Another of Aquinas' efforts, the Argument from Degree, is worth
spelling out, for it epitomises the characteristic flabbiness
of theological
reasoning. We notice degrees of, say, goodness or temperature,
and we measure them, Aquinas said, by reference to a maximum:
Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus,
as fire, which is the maximum of heat, is the cause of all
hot things
. . . Therefore, there must also be something which is to all
beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other
perfection; and this we call God.
That's an argument? You might as well say that people vary
in smelliness but we can make the judgment only by reference
to
a perfect maximum
of conceivable smelliness. Therefore there must exist a pre-eminently
peerless stinker, and we call him God. Or substitute any dimension
of comparison you like, and derive an equivalently fatuous
conclusion. That's theology.
The only one of the traditional arguments for God that is widely
used today is the teleological argument, sometimes called the
Argument from Design although – since the name begs the question of its validity
– it should better be called the Argument for Design. It is the familiar
'watchmaker' argument, which is surely one of the most superficially
plausible bad arguments ever discovered – and it is rediscovered
by just about everybody until they are taught the logical fallacy
and Darwin's brilliant alternative.
In the familiar world of human artifacts, complicated things
that look designed are designed. To naïve observers, it seems to
follow that similarly complicated things in the natural world that
look designed – things like eyes and hearts – are designed too. It
isn't just an argument by analogy. There is a semblance of statistical
reasoning here too – fallacious, but carrying an illusion of plausibility.
If you randomly scramble the fragments of an eye or a leg or a heart
a million times, you'd be lucky to hit even one combination that
could see, walk or pump. This demonstrates that such devices could
not have been put together by chance. And of course, no sensible
scientist ever said they could. Lamentably, the scientific education
of most British and American students omits all mention of Darwinism,
and therefore the only alternative to chance that most people can
imagine is design.
Even before Darwin's time, the illogicality was glaring: how
could it ever have been a good idea to postulate, in explanation
for
the existence of improbable things, a designer who would have
to be even
more improbable? The entire argument is a logical non-starter,
as David Hume realized before Darwin was born. What Hume didn't
know
was the supremely elegant alternative to both chance and design
that Darwin was to give us. Natural selection is so stunningly
powerful
and elegant, it not only explains the whole of life, it raises
our consciousness and boosts our confidence in science's future
ability
to explain everything else.
Natural selection is not just an alternative to chance. It
is the only ultimate alternative ever suggested. Design is
a workable
explanation for organized complexity only in the short term.
It
is not an ultimate
explanation, because designers themselves demand an explanation.
If, as Francis Crick and Leslie Orgel once playfully speculated,
life on this planet was deliberately seeded by a payload of
bacteria in the nose cone of a rocket, we still need an explanation
for
the intelligent aliens who dispatched the rocket. Ultimately
they must
have evolved by gradual degrees from simpler beginnings. Only
evolution, or some kind of gradualistic 'crane' (to use Daniel
Dennett's neat
term), is capable of terminating the regress. Natural selection
is an anti-chance process, which gradually builds up complexity,
step
by tiny step. The end product of this ratcheting process is
an eye, or a heart, or a brain – a device whose improbable
complexity
is
utterly baffling until you spot the gentle ramp that leads
up to it.
Whether my conjecture is right that evolution is the only explanation
for life in the universe, there is no doubt that it is the
explanation for life on this planet. Evolution is a fact, and
it is among
the more secure facts known to science. But it had to get started
somehow.
Natural selection cannot work its wonders until certain minimal
conditions are in place, of which the most important is an
accurate system of
replication – DNA, or something that works like DNA.
The origin of life on this planet – which means the origin of the
first self-replicating molecule - is hard to study, because it (probably)
only happened once, 4 billion years ago and under very different
conditions from those with which we are familiar. We may never know
how it happened. Unlike the ordinary evolutionary events that followed,
it must have been a genuinely very improbable – in the sense of unpredictable
– event: too improbable, perhaps, for chemists to reproduce it in
the laboratory or even devise a plausible theory for what happened.
This weirdly paradoxical conclusion – that a chemical account of
the origin of life, in order to be plausible, has to be implausible
– would follow if it were the case that life is extremely rare in
the universe. And indeed we have never encountered any hint of extraterrestrial
life, not even by radio – the circumstance that prompted Enrico Fermi's
cry: "Where is everybody?"
Suppose life's origin on a planet took place through a hugely
improbable stroke of luck, so improbable that it happens on
only one in a
billion planets. The National Science Foundation would laugh
at any chemist
whose proposed research had only a one in a hundred chance
of succeeding, let alone one in a billion. Yet, given that
there
are at least
a billion billion planets in the universe, even such absurdly
low odds
as these will yield life on a billion planets. And – this is where
the famous anthropic principle comes in – Earth has to be one of
them, because here we are.
If you set out in a spaceship to find the one planet in the
galaxy that has life, the odds against your finding it would
be so great
that the task would be indistinguishable, in practice, from
impossible. But if you are alive (as you manifestly are if
you are about
to step into a spaceship) you needn't bother to go looking
for that
one planet
because, by definition, you are already standing on it. The
anthropic principle really is rather elegant. By the way, I
don't actually
think the origin of life was as improbable as all that. I think
the galaxy has plenty of islands of life dotted about, even
if the islands
are too spaced out for any one to hope for a meeting with any
other. My point is only that, given the number of planets in
the universe,
the origin of life could in theory be as lucky as a blindfolded
golfer scoring a hole in one. The beauty of the anthropic principle
is that,
even in the teeth of such stupefying odds against, it still
gives us a perfectly satisfying explanation for life's presence
on
our own planet.
The anthropic principle is usually applied not to planets but
to universes. Physicists have suggested that the laws and constants
of physics are too good – as if the universe were set up to favour
our eventual evolution. It is as though there were, say, half a dozen
dials representing the major constants of physics. Each of the dials
could in principle be tuned to any of a wide range of values. Almost
all of these knob-twiddlings would yield a universe in which life
would be impossible. Some universes would fizzle out within the first
picosecond. Others would contain no elements heavier than hydrogen
and helium. In yet others, matter would never condense into stars
(and you need stars in order to forge the elements of chemistry and
hence life). You can estimate the very low odds against the six knobs
all just happening to be correctly tuned, and conclude that a divine
knob-twiddler must have been at work. But, as we have already seen,
that explanation is vacuous because it begs the biggest question
of all. The divine knob twiddler would himself have to have been
at least as improbable as the settings of his knobs.
Again, the anthropic principle delivers its devastatingly neat
solution. Physicists already have reason to suspect that our
universe – everything
we can see – is only one universe among perhaps billions. Some theorists
postulate a multiverse of foam, where the universe we know is just
one bubble. Each bubble has its own laws and constants. Our familiar
laws of physics are parochial bylaws. Of all the universes in the
foam, only a minority has what it takes to generate life. And, with
anthropic hindsight, we obviously have to be sitting in a member
of that minority, because, well, here we are, aren't we? As physicists
have said, it is no accident that we see stars in our sky, for a
universe without stars would also lack the chemical elements necessary
for life. There may be universes whose skies have no stars: but they
also have no inhabitants to notice the lack. Similarly, it is no
accident that we see a rich diversity of living species: for an evolutionary
process that is capable of yielding a species that can see things
and reflect on them cannot help producing lots of other species at
the same time. The reflective species must be surrounded by an ecosystem,
as it must be surrounded by stars.
The anthropic principle entitles us to postulate a massive
dose of luck in accounting for the existence of life on our
planet.
But there
are limits. We are allowed one stroke of luck for the origin
of evolution, and perhaps for a couple of other unique events
like
the origin of
the eukaryotic cell and the origin of consciousness. But that's
the end of our entitlement to large-scale luck. We emphatically
cannot
invoke major strokes of luck to account for the illusion of
design that glows from each of the billion species of living
creature
that have ever lived on Earth. The evolution of life is a general
and
continuing process, producing essentially the same result in
all species, however different the details.
Contrary to what is sometimes alleged, evolution is a predictive
science. If you pick any hitherto unstudied species and subject
it to minute scrutiny, any evolutionist will confidently predict
that
each individual will be observed to do everything in its power,
in the particular way of the species – plant, herbivore, carnivore,
nectivore or whatever it is – to survive and propagate the DNA that
rides inside it. We won't be around long enough to test the prediction
but we can say, with great confidence, that if a comet strikes Earth
and wipes out the mammals, a new fauna will rise to fill their shoes,
just as the mammals filled those of the dinosaurs 65 million years
ago. And the range of parts played by the new cast of life's drama
will be similar in broad outline, though not in detail, to the roles
played by the mammals, and the dinosaurs before them, and the mammal-like
reptiles before the dinosaurs. The same rules are predictably being
followed, in millions of species all over the globe, and for hundreds
of millions of years. Such a general observation requires an entirely
different explanatory principle from the anthropic principle that
explains one-off events like the origin of life, or the origin of
the universe, by luck. That entirely different principle is natural
selection.
We explain our existence by a combination of the anthropic
principle and Darwin's principle of natural selection. That
combination
provides a complete and deeply satisfying explanation for everything
that
we see and know. Not only is the god hypothesis unnecessary.
It is spectacularly unparsimonious. Not only do we need no
God to
explain
the universe and life. God stands out in the universe as the
most glaring of all superfluous sore thumbs. We cannot, of
course, disprove
God, just as we can't disprove Thor, fairies, leprechauns and
the Flying Spaghetti Monster. But, like those other fantasies
that
we can't disprove, we can say that God is very very improbable.
Richard Dawkins is the Charles Simonyi Professor of the Public
Understanding of Science at Oxford University. He is a Fellow
of the Royal Society,
and the author of nine books, including The Selfish Gene, The
Blind Watchmaker and The Ancestor's Tale. His new book, The
God Delusion,
published last week by Houghton Mifflin, is already a NEW YORK
TIMES bestseller, and his Foundation for Reason and Science
launched at
the same time (see RichardDawkins.net). .
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