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Marvin
L. Minsky
Marvin
Minsky has made many contributions to AI, cognitive psychology,
mathematics, computational linguistics, robotics, and optics.
In recent years he has worked chiefly on imparting to machines
the human capacity for commonsense reasoning. His conception
of human intellectual structure and function is presented
in The Society
of Mind, which is also the title of the course he
teaches at MIT. He received the BA and PhD in mathematics
at Harvard and Princeton. In 1951 he built the SNARC, the
first neural network simulator. His other inventions include
mechanical hands and other robotic devices, the confocal
scanning microscope, the "Muse" synthesizer for
musical variations (with E. Fredkin), and the first LOGO "turtle" (with
S. Papert). A member of the NAS, NAE and Argentine NAS, he
has received the ACM Turing Award, the MIT Killian Award,
the Japan Prize, the IJCAI Research Excellence Award, the
Rank Prize and the Robert Wood Prize for Optoelectronics,
and the Benjamin Franklin Medal. Minsky's current work in
progress is titled The
Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence,
and the Future of Human Kind (due September, 2006). A pre-release,
draft version of this book is available on Minsky's website.

Related Links
• Marvin
Minsky's home
page
• Marvin
Minsky's Wikipedia
page
• Brief Academic Biography of Marvin Minsky
• MIT
Press interview with Marvin Minsky
• NICSI
video interview with Marvin Minsky
• Marvin
Minsky's Usenet posts
• Conscious
Machines, by Marvin Minsky
• A
Framework for Representing Knowledge, by Marvin Minsky
• Review
of Marvin Minsky's book, Society of Mind
 Marvin
Minsky Quotes
What magical trick makes us intelligent? The
trick is that there is no trick. The power of intelligence stems
from our vast diversity, not from any single, perfect principle.
Our species has evolved many effective although imperfect methods,
and each of us individually develops more on our own. Eventually,
very few of our actions and decisions come to depend on any single
mechanism. Instead, they emerge from conflicts and negotiations
among societies of processes that constantly challenge one another.
Our present culture may be largely shaped
by this strange idea of isolating children's thought from adult
thought. Perhaps the way our culture educated its children better
explains why most of us come out as dumb as they do, than it
explains how some of us come out as smart as they do.
Eventually, robots will make everything.
Even the most technically, sophisticated people
maintain that whatever consciousness might be, it has a quality
that categorically places it outside the realm of science, namely,
a subjective character that is makes it utterly private and unobservable.
Why do so many people feel that consciousness cannot be explained
in terms of anything science can presently do?
We humans do not possess much consciousness.
That is, we have very little natural ability to sense what happens
within and outside ourselves.
It seems entirely clear to me that consciousness
has usefulness.
It seems to me that the ingredients of most
theories both in Artificial Intelligence and in Psychology have
been on
the whole too minute, local, and unstructured to account – either
practically or phenomenologically – for the effectiveness of
common-sense thought. The "chunks" of reasoning, language,
memory, and "perception" ought to be larger and more
structured; their factual and procedural contents must be more
intimately connected in order to explain the apparent power and
speed of mental activities.
I draw no boundary between a theory of human
thinking and a scheme for making an intelligent machine; no purpose
would be served by separating these today since neither domain
has theories good enough to explain – or to produce – enough
mental capacity. There is, however, a difference in professional
attitudes. Workers from psychology inherit stronger desires to
minimize the variety of assumed mechanisms. I believe this leads
to attempts to extract more performance from fewer "basic
mechanisms" than is reasonable. Such theories especially neglect
mechanisms of procedure control and explicit representations of
processes. On the other side, workers in Artificial Intelligence
have perhaps focused too sharply on just such questions. Neither
have they given enough attention to the structure of knowledge,
especially procedural knowledge.

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